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Lapham: Reasonable Double Definitional Instruction Results in Abolishing

CRIMINAL

LAW-DEFINITIONAL INSTRUCTION-REASONABLE DOUBT
DEFINITIONAL INSTRUCTION RESULTS IN ABOLISHING "EXCLUSION OF

OUTSTANDING REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS" AS STANDARD OF REVIEW IN

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CASES.

Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1991).

Douglas Alan Geesa, a repeat felony offender, was convicted of the offense
of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Geesa's conviction was based entirely upon circumstantial evidence.' The jury assessed punishment at forty
years imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. The court of appeals applied the "reasonable-hypothesis-ofinnocence analytical construct," dictated by 136 years of precedent, and
found the evidence failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than
guilt.2 Thus, based on insufficiency of the evidence, the court of appeals
reversed the conviction and ordered the trial court to enter a judgment of
acquittal.3 However, the court of criminal appeals reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for a new trial. The court of criminal appeals
determined that the "reasonable-hypothesis-of-innocence analytical construct" is no longer an appropriate standard of review in evaluating circumstantial evidence cases.4 In addition, and in response to its decision to
abandon the "reasonable-hypothesis-of-innocence analytical construct," the
1. The crucial element in obtaining a conviction for the offense of unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle is establishing that the defendant operated the vehicle. A summary of the evidence adduced at trial which linked the defendant to the vehicle is as follows:
The police were summoned after a witness observed a truck, containing two men, pull
into and park at a closed Texaco service station. The reporting witness provided the
police with a description of the occupants' clothing but was unable to describe their faces.
The witness told the police that one of the men in the truck was wearing a white T-shirt
and cream-colored pants. This description matched the clothing worn by Geesa who was
found at the southwest corner of the premises. After determining the truck was stolen,
Geesa was arrested. Geesa denied having any knowledge of the truck and claimed to have
walked to the Texaco station. However, Geesa's fingerprints were found on three packages of cigarettes located on the dashboard inside the truck. The arresting officer testified
that his dispatcher told him that the driver of the vehicle was wearing a white T-shirt and
cream-colored pants; however, at trial, the reporting witness did not recall telling anyone
which of the two men was the driver.
Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 176-78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
2. Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 177.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 155.
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court of criminal appeals held that a definitional instruction on6 "reasonable
doubt" 5 is essential for all cases tried after November 6, 1991.
As early as 1855, Texas courts recognized the distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence. 7 Direct evidence occurs when a witness with
personal knowledge testifies as to disputed facts.' Circumstantial evidence,
on the other hand, assumes a witness has no personal knowledge of the disputed facts, but is aware of other facts and circumstances which, when tendered into evidence, may permit the factfinder to infer whether or not the
disputed facts existed. 9 The inference establishing the disputed facts is permitted upon showing that a reasonable relationship can be deduced between
the known facts and those facts sought to be ascertained.' 0
In 1855, the Texas Supreme Court, then empowered with criminal juris-

5. The definitional instruction of "reasonable doubt" as mandated by the court provides:
All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense
unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that a
person has been arrested, confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged with, the offense
gives rise to no inference of guilt at his trial. The law does not require a defendant to
prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all. The presumption of innocence alone
is sufficient to acquit the defendant, unless the jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence
inthe case.
The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty and it must do so by
proving each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt and if it
fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant.
It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution's proof excludes all "reasonable doubt" concerning the defendant's guilt.
A "reasonable doubt" is a doubt based on reason and common sense after a careful and
impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case. It is the kind of doubt that would
make a reasonable person hesitate to act in the most important of his own affairs.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs.
In the event you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt after considering all
the evidence before you, and these instructions, you will acquit him and say by your
verdict "Not Guilty".
Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 162.
6. The author expresses no opinion as to whether or not limited prospectivity is the
proper conclusion in giving effect to a new rule.
7. See Henderson v. State, 14 Tex. 503, 512-13 (1855) (direct evidence is not only means
of establishing main fact).
8. See Rodriguez v. State, 617 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (definition of

direct evidence). See generally I CHARLES E. TORCIA,

WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE

§6

at 4-6 (13th ed. 1972) (discussing direct and circumstantial evidence).
9. See Rodriguez v. State, 617 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (definition of

circumstantial evidence).
10. Id.
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diction, adopted the Commonwealth v. Webster" standard for review of convictions based upon circumstantial evidence in Henderson v. State.'2 The
standard, in its simplest form, provides that a reviewing court shall not uphold the defendant's conviction if the evidence supports an inference other
than a finding of guilt. 13 In adopting this standard of review, the Henderson
court implicitly gave its approval to the use of a cautionary jury instruction
on the law of circumstantial evidence in cases where the conviction would
rest wholly on circumstantial evidence, according to Justice Maloney. 4 By
1857, failure to include a proper cautionary jury instruction resulted in a
reversal where circumstantial evidence was the basis of the conviction. 5 It
was not until 1879, however, that a specific cautionary jury instruction was
required in cases based wholly on circumstantial evidence.1 6 The cautionary
jury instruction in circumstantial evidence cases provided, in part, that the
evidence must eliminate all other reasonable
hypotheses other than the de17
certainty.
moral
with
guilt
fendant's
However, some 125 years later in 1983, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals abolished the long-standing tradition of including a cautionary jury
instruction in circumstantial evidence cases in Hankins v. State.'" The Hankins majority reasoned that the language contained in a 1954 United States
Supreme Court opinion, Holland v. United States, 9 was controlling and
adopted the language as its own.20 The Holland Court determined an additional jury instruction in circumstantial evidence cases is misleading and incorrect if the jury has been properly instructed on reasonable doubt.2 ' In
effect, the court recognized that circumstantial evidence is often as persua-

11. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295 (1850).
12. Henderson, 14 Tex. at 514.
13. See, e.g., Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Carlsen v.
State, 654 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450, 456
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Wilson
v. State, 654 S.W.2d 465, 471-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
14. Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 159 n.5.

15. Burrell v. State, 18 Tex. 713, 734-35 (1857).
16. Hunt v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. App. 212, 236 (1879).
17. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Onion, J., dissent-

ing) (furnishes cautionary jury instruction for circumstantial evidence cases).
18. Hankins, 646 S.W.2d at 197. See generally Jeffrey S. Alley, Note, Elimination of the

Texas Cautionary CircumstantialEvidence Charge: Hankins v. State, 646 S W.2d 191 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983), 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 459, 472-73 (1984) (criticizing court of criminal

appeals for failing to suggest alternative to cautionary jury charge in circumstantial evidence
cases after abolishing it); Donald L. Gaffney, Note, The CircumstantialEvidence Charge in
Texas CriminalCases: A RetrogradeDoctrine, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1255 (1977) (Texas cautionary
jury charge in circumstantial evidence cases).
19. 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
20. Hankins, 646 S.W.2d at 199.

21. Holland, 348 U.S. at 139-40.
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sive as direct evidence. 22 Although the Hankins majority expressly abolished the additional jury instruction for circumstantial evidence cases, it
failed to comment on the standard to be applied in reviewing cases based
23
wholly on circumstantial evidence.
Prior to Hankins, the Supreme Court had decided another important decision relevant to the standard of review in circumstantial evidence cases. In
Jackson v. Virginia,24 the United States Supreme Court set forth the exclusive standard of review for analyzing attacks targeted at sufficiency of the
evidence.2" This decision was rendered twenty-five years after Holland but
four years prior to Texas abolishing the additional cautionary jury instruction in circumstantial evidence cases. The Jackson Court held that in reviewing insufficiency of the evidence claims the focus is not whether the jury
was properly instructed, but to ascertain whether the transcript of the record
plausibly supports a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 26 More specifically, the Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard for reviewing
insufficiency of the evidence claims in either direct or circumstantial cases is
whether, upon considering the evidence in the light most advantageous to
the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the crucial elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court of criminal appeals later confronted the Jackson decision headon in Griffin v. State, and announced that the standard of review in Jackson
is binding, but such standard constitutes only a minimum for upholding convictions.2" Moreover, the Griffin court recognized that states may permissibly set higher standards of review than that provided in the Federal
Constitution. 29 The Griffin decision came two years after Jackson but two
years prior to Hankins. Thus, from 1879 until 1983 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals specifically and unequivocally upheld the use of a cautionary jury instruction for circumstantial evidence cases and the exclusion of
the reasonable-hypothesis-of-innocence analytical construct as the appropriate standard of review for such cases.
Although the Hankins majority abolished the cautionary jury instruction
in circumstantial evidence cases, it explicitly retained the reasonable-hypothesis-of-innocence analytical construct standard of review in its later decisions. 3° In fact, the court of criminal appeals decisions (commonly referred

22. Hankins, 646 S.W.2d at 198.
23. Id. at 217 (Onion, J., dissenting).
24. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).

25. Id. at 318-19.
26. Id. at 318.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 319.
Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
Id. at 155 n.5.
E.g., Butler, 769 S.W.2d at 238 n. 1. The following cases compose the Carlsen quartet:
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to as the Carlsen quartet) discussing the standard contain identical language
and all provide:
Still, we are unable to devise or discover any reason, compelling or otherwise, for abandoningthe utilitarian "exclusion of outstandingreasonable
hypothesis" analysisfor applying the above "standardof review" in circumstantialevidence cases. By the nature of circumstantial evidence, in
order to determine it rationally establishes guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, a process of elimination must be used.3 1
In Butler v. State,32 the court of criminal appeals further reiterated its holding that the Carlsen quartet contains the appropriate standard of review for
circumstantial evidence cases. 33
Although the court of criminal appeals established a standard of review
for circumstantial evidence convictions, it had never defined reasonable
doubt, either statutorily or by jury charge, prior to Geesa.34 In fact, on
many occasions since the beginning of Texas jurisprudence, courts have specifically and categorically denied adopting such a jury instruction. 35 As recently as Hankins, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that
it is an insignificant distinction that federal jurisdictions require a definitional instruction of reasonable doubt while Texas does not.36
Now ironically, two years after upholding the exclusion of the outstanding
reasonable hypothesis as an appropriate standard of review in circumstantial
cases, the majority in Geesa has abolished the practice of employing such a
standard in analyzing sufficiency of the evidence attacks.3 7 Furthermore, as
a result of eliminating this standard of review, the court of criminal appeals
now finds
it necessary to require a jury instruction defining reasonable
38
doubt:
Although Geesa uproots firmly established Texas jurisprudence, the maCarlsen, 654 S.W.2d at 449; Freeman, 654 S.W.2d at 456; Denby, 654 S.W.2d at 464; Wilson,
654 S.W.2d at 471-72.
31. Carlsen, 654 S.W.2d at 449; Freeman, 654 S.W.2d at 455; Denby, 654 S.W.2d at 464;
Wilson, 654 S.W.2d at 471-72 (emphasis added).
32. 769 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
33. Id. at 238 n.l.
34. Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 161 n.10.
35. Texas has, however, employed a nondefinitional charge on reasonable doubt since
1974. Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 161 n. 10. The following decisions have refused the invitation to
adopt a definitional instruction for reasonable doubt. E.g., Pigg v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 521,
523, 287 S.W.2d 673, 674 (1956); Sagu v. State, 94 Tex. Crim. 14, 16, 248 S.W. 390, 391
(1923); Lenert v. State, 63 S.W. 563, 565 (Ct. Crim. App. 1901); Massey v. State, 1 Tex. Ct.
App. 563, 570 (1877); see Hankins, 646 S.W.2d at 208 (Onion, J., dissenting) (Texas decisions
which have refused to adopt a definition of reasonable doubt).
36. Hankins, 646 S.W.2d at 199 n.l.
37. Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 161.
38. Id. at 162.
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jority reasoned their decision was justified. First, the Geesa majority concluded the dichotomy in the law created by the Hankins decision must be
mended.39 The majority reasoned that because juries no longer receive a
cautionary instruction in circumstantial evidence cases, it is improper for
appellate courts to apply the exclusion of the reasonable hypothesis theory.' °
Judge Maloney maintains that the jury instruction and standard of review
are two interdependent concepts which are unable to exist independently.4 1
Secondly, the majority maintains that the exclusion of the outstanding reasonable hypothesis has proved to be confusing and difficult to apply by some
reviewing courts. 4 2 Lastly, the majority asserts that the United States
Supreme Court and other jurisdictions have expressly disapproved of the
reasonable hypothesis theory.4 3 Thus, in an apparent effort to comply with
Jackson, the majority declared it is imperative to provide a definitional instruction of reasonable doubt in all cases tried after November 6, 1991."
Justice Clinton's dissent criticizes the majority's reasoning for deviating
from an established and workable standard. 4 5 He suggests that the majority's reasoning is flawed in that the reasonable hypothesis of innocence analytical construct was simply a process of elimination utilized by appellate
courts.4 6 The process enabled appellate courts to determine if the evidence
contained in the record met the constitutional minimum set forth in Jackson
by answering the question: Whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt after
viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.4 7
Clinton argues that the application of the reasonable hypothesis theory
could result in obtaining a higher threshold than that mandated by Jackson,
but that states are within their right to provide greater protection to their
residents than that guaranteed by the federal Constitution. This is not to say
that the ultimate standard of review in circumstantial and direct evidence
cases is different; but, that different approaches can be utilized in determining whether the evidence complies with the Jackson criterion.4 8 The point
being, that prior to Geesa, a process existed for appellate courts to "conduct
an evidentiary analysis in making the critical inquiry and in answering the

39. Id. at 159.
40. Id.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at n.5.
Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 160.
Id. at 160-61.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 175 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
Id. at 171 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 167 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
Id. at 171 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
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relevant question prescribed in Jackson v. Virginia."4 9 The dissent also
counters the majority's argument by citing decisions in which appellate
courts have successfully and properly applied the reasonable hypothesis theory to support its argument that the previous standard was indeed workable.5 o Furthermore, the dissent maintains that disapproval of the reasonable
hypothesis theory is not a new phenomena as the majority implies. In fact,
such criticism existed long before the court of criminal appeals decided the
Carlsen quartet, and despite its unpopularity, the Court made a conscious
decision to uphold the exclusion of the reasonable hypothesis theory. 5
Lastly, Justice Clinton noted requiring such a definition is an act which the
court of criminal appeals, since its existence, has steadfastly refused to do.5 2
At the onset, Texas adopted the exclusion of the reasonable hypothesis as
a standard of review some years prior to requiring a cautionary jury instruction in circumstantial evidence cases. 53 Furthermore, for the last eight
years, this standard of review has continued to be utilized in reviewing insufficiency of the evidence claims even though the court of criminal appeals
chose to eliminate the practice of including a cautionary jury instruction in
circumstantial evidence cases. The fact that the "exclusion of the reasonable
hypothesis" standard of review existed independently and successfully without the cautionary jury instruction, raises the question: Why has the majority now decided that the two concepts are interdependent and that the
"exclusion of the reasonable hypothesis standard" cannot possibly exist
without the cautionary jury instruction when it has existed independently for
many years? Although the two concepts were used together for well over a
hundred years, that in itself does not necessarily make them interdependent.
Since its very existence, Texas has consciously and specifically refused to
provide a definitional instruction for reasonable doubt. 54 One must assume
the courts' conscious exclusion was for a valid reason-perhaps inclusion of
such a definition would overcomplicate a jury's thought process and fail to
give jury members credit for some rational thought process. Additionally,
since 1855, Texas courts have consistently and successfully applied the "exclusion of the reasonable hypothesis analysis" as the standard of review in

49. Id. at 174 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
50. Butler, 769 S.W.2d at 240; see also Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 172 (Clinton, J., dissenting)
(decisions utilizing exclusion of reasonable hypothesis); Garrett v. State, 682 S.W.2d 301, 30405 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (proper use of exlusion of reasonable hypothesis by appellate
court). But see, Goff v. State, 777 S.W. 2d 418, 420-21 (1987) (improper application of exclusion of reasonable hypothesis by appellate court).
51. Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 172 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 174 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
53. Hankins, 646 S.W.2d at 207 (Onion, J., dissenting).
54. Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 161 n.10.
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circumstantial evidence cases." However, the real tragedy in Geesa is not
that the majority has ignored 136 years of precedent followed by fourteen
appellate courts, but that it has completely failed to provide a standard for
appellate courts to follow in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence challenges.
Appellate courts are now left to conjure up their own standards of review
leaving a potential inconsistency in how the Jackson requirements will be
achieved and applied in Texas. Judge Onion, in Hankins, criticized the majority for abolishing the cautionary jury instruction without commenting on
the proper standard of review for circumstantial evidence cases.56 The confusion the court of criminal appeals then chose to clarify after Hankins in
the Carlsen quartet has now been reborn in Geesa-What exactly is or will
be the appropriate standard to be applied when reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence convictions based on circumstantial evidence to achieve the
constitutional requirements set forth in Jackson?
A simple analogy illustrates the point. It was not uncommon for doctors
to use ordinary table knives and meat cleavers for surgery on their patients
during the Civil War. As technology progressed scalpels replaced meat
cleavers in the operating room. Today, in many instances, laser beams have
replaced the use of scalpels. The exclusion of the reasonable hypothesis,
when adopted, was a tool used by reviewing courts to determine if the evidence was sufficient to uphold a conviction in circumstantial evidence cases
much like table knives and meat cleavers were used as surgical instruments.
Over the years, the courts refined the exclusion of the reasonable hypothesis
into a more delicate and precise instrument to achieve the Jackson criteria
much like the scalpel becoming a more refined surgical instrument. Today,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals discards the laser beam and scalpel (a
workable standard of review) without any advance in technology (a more
refined standard of review) to take the laser beam's and scalpel's place. The
court has neither developed or suggested a tool to replace the exclusion of
the reasonable hypothesis theory.
The Geesa majority has embarked into new and dangerous territory by
eliminating the exclusion of the reasonable hypothesis as a standard of review in circumstantial evidence cases without providing a replacement standard of review, and by adopting a definitional instruction of reasonable
doubt. The danger has not necessarily resulted from emasculating the longstanding standard of review, or even from adopting a definitional instruction
of reasonable doubt; the danger lies in the majority's failure to provide the
appropriate method for reviewing insufficiency of the evidence attacks.
Without instruction, appellate courts will have no guidance in their attempts
to achieve the Jackson mandate in analyzing insufficiency of the evidence

55. Id. at 172 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
56. Hankins, 646 S.W.2d at 217 (Onion, J., dissenting).
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claims. One cannot attempt to speculate what impact will result from discarding a tried and true tool that has been in use for over a hundred years
with no alternatives. But in future decisions, the Geesa majority would be
wise to take heed in the old adage "if it ain't broke, don't fix it."
John J. Lapham
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